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The Asia-Pacific War caused by Imperial Japan in the first half of the twentieth
century is an important topic for the East Asian STS studies. It was an event which
vastly changed the interrelationships among science, technology, and society in
Japan and the other East Asian countries and areas. And it also affected the postwar
developments in these countries and areas in various ways. We cannot fully
understand the present STS issues in East Asia without knowing the changing STS
interrelationships in the war, but studies on this topic are still in the rudimentary
stage.
In Japan since the 1980s the historical studies on wartime science and technology
in Japan and its former colonies have been progressing and, in recent years,
transnational cooperation with European and Asian scholars has begun, good
examples of which are the contributions of Japanese scholars to the publication of
this international STS journal.
However, the English-language literature on Japan’s wartime science and
technology was very scarce, probably because of linguistic barriers on both the
Japanese and non-Japanese sides. Grunden’s Secret Weapons and World War II is the
first English-language book on this topic and is extensively based on numerous
Japanese as well as English-language sources available at present.
Walter E. Grunden, associate professor of history at Bowling Green State
University, Ohio, USA, studied modern Japanese history, modern Chinese history,
and the history of science during his graduate school days at the Ohio State
University and the University of California, Santa Barbara. He wrote his Ph.D. thesis
in 1998 entitled “Science under the Rising Sun: Weapons Development and the
Organization of Scientific Research in World War II Japan.” Secret Weapons and
World War II is a revised and enlarged version of his Ph.D. thesis, especially
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drawing upon Japanese-language sources collected during his stay in Tokyo in
2001–2002.
Focusing on the development of several advanced, so-called “secret” weapons,
Grunden examines science and technology mobilization in Japan during World War
II. For comparison, he begins each chapter with an outline of weapons development
and science mobilization of the other principal belligerents (the United States, Great
Britain, the Soviet Union, and Germany).
In the Introduction, Grunden raises two questions: What impact did science have
on the war; and what impact did the war have on science in Japan? Although he
says that the latter is “perhaps the more significant and interesting question,” the
succeeding chapters are concerned with the former question. The discussion about
the latter question appears only in the Epilogue.
Chapter 1, “Mobilizing Science and Technology for War,” gives an overview of
the development of Japan’s science and technology policy as well as its science and
technology mobilization system from World War I to 1945. Grunden concludes:
“Thus, a picture emerges wherein conflict plagued the Japanese system from the
macro level of government organization to the micro level of the individual scientist
in the laboratory, whether military or civilian. Japan was unable to mobilize its
science and technology infrastructure to its full capacity during World War II largely
as a result of the polycratic nature of the national government and the ubiquitous
interservice rivalry” (p. 46). We might summarize his argument in the following
manner: The Japanese failed to mobilize science and technology and were unable to
make any advanced weapons. In contrast, the Americans successfully mobilized
science and technology and were able to make and use advanced weapons such as
atomic bombs, which contributed to the American victory over Japan. This is the
impact of science on the war.
From Chapter 2 to Chapter 5, Grunden repeats this story in detail taking examples
from the belligerents’ efforts to develop a number of advanced weapons during
World War II: the atomic bomb (Ch. 2), radar and the “death ray” (Ch. 3), guided
missiles and jet aircraft (Ch. 4), and chemical and biological weapons (Ch. 5). The
primary sources he used extensively in these chapters are intelligence reports made
by various U.S. intelligence units during and after the war, which are now held in
archives and libraries in the Unites States. Although he says that he has “attempted
to verify information by cross-referencing the Japanese- and English-language
sources” (p. 11), most of the Japanese-language sources he used were made not in
wartime but after the war. Therefore, some bias coming from that seems to be
inevitable. Throughout these chapters, his conclusion is almost always the same: The
Westerners succeeded, but the Japanese failed.
In the Epilogue, “The Impact of World War II on Science in Japan,” Grunden
gives brief accounts of the postwar activities of some Japanese scientists and
engineers who conducted wartime research. And he concludes this book with the
following suggestion: “The examples given above suggest that there was great
continuity in institutions and personnel from the war into the postwar period. In
particular, the experience and training gained during the war provided many
scientists and engineers the means to make significant contributions to the
reconstruction of Japan and its economic growth after the war. One might argue
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that the war, on the whole, had a positive impact on science in Japan, despite even
all the tragedies the war had brought about” (p. 204).
Both of the answers to the questions raised in the Introduction seem not to be so
original. Arguments on Japan’s ineffective science mobilization and prevailing
rivalries are found in reports made by the U.S. intelligence officers in 1945. An
argument on positive effects of the Japanese wartime experiences and institutions
upon the postwar development is found in an article written by the Japanese science
historian Hiroshige Tetsu in 1965. Grunden cites these arguments from such old
sources without putting those into any new perspectives.
What one might think original is the concept of “Big Science revolution.” He
argues that “there was no Big Science revolution in Japan as occurred elsewhere in
the West during World War II” (p. 5). According to him, Big Science is “a type of
science that is necessarily large in scale and scope, but size alone is not the most
distinguishing characteristic.” It “requires the intersection of three essential elements:
science, economy, and the state.” The Manhattan Project is a typical example of Big
Science.
Is this concept of “Big Science revolution” useful for examining Japan’s wartime
science and technology mobilization? Grunden tends to select and emphasize
negative aspects of wartime Japan in order to argue that there was no Big Science
revolution in Japan. But this tendency has him failing to treat fairly not so
revolutionary but important changes in Japan’s science and technology system
during the war. I think this is a major reason why he does not describe positive
aspects of Japan’s science and technology mobilization in the main chapters, but
only “suggests” them in the Epilogue. In addition, a minor reason for that, I think, is
that the primary sources he used most often were intelligence reports. Impressed by
the Japanese defeat, both U.S. interviewers and Japanese interviewees were probably
interested in why Japan failed and the Allies succeeded. Under such interest, positive
aspects might have been neglected.
In my opinion, a so-called “Big Science revolution” was also beginning in
wartime Japan, for the three elements (science, economy, and the state) were being
more and more closely interrelated for wartime R&D in Japan. In this regard, Japan
and Western nations were experiencing the same process in the world history of
science.
Grunden’s emphasis on Japanese failure and Western success seems to make his
international comparison less fruitful. Polycracy and rivalries were not unique to
Japan, as he also admits in his book. If he had examined both common and different
features in the belligerents’ science mobilization more exactly, his comparison would
have been more fruitful.
Such analytical weakness aside, Grunden’s Secret Weapons and World War II is a
very informative work on wartime science and technology mobilization in Japan,
with more than 100 pages of tables, notes, bibliography, and index. Although we
cannot use this book as a fully reliable reference book, because of some mistakes
especially in identifying and understanding a large number of organizations with
similar names and complicated interrelationships, this book will continue to serve as
an indispensable guide for not only non-Japanese but also Japanese scholars
studying Japan’s wartime science and technology mobilization.
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Recently the conditions for transnational research cooperation are getting better.
For example, not mentioned in Grunden’s book, the Japan Center for Asian
Historical Records (JACAR) of the National Archives of Japan has provided an
extremely large number of primary sources related to the Asia-Pacific War as graphic
data through the Internet since 2001. The website (http://www.jacar.go.jp/) is written
in Japanese, English, Chinese, and Korean, and keyword search is available in
Japanese and English. These useful sources are not yet fully utilized by both
Japanese and non-Japanese scholars.
I hope Grunden’s valuable work will stimulate further interest in Japan’s wartime
science, technology, and society among scholars worldwide, and transnational
cooperation in research will be prospering.
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